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The Right Model for Addressing Uncertainties with the Future? 
 
 
 
Inflation and unexpected costs for health care, including long-term care services, are 
the two biggest risks that can lead people to have insufficient income for their post-
retirement lifetime in the United States.  Unfortunately, most people do not fully 
appreciate these financial risks and do not save as much as analysts have estimated 
is necessary (Elmendorf and Sheiner, 2000). 
With the elderly comprising growing shares of countries’ populations and current 
estimates indicating that at least 70 percent of people who reach age 65 will need 
some sort of assistance with activities of daily living in their remaining years of life, 
(Kemper et al., 2005; Dilnot Commission, 2011; Sun and Webb, 2013) there is 
growing recognition that current public programs funding long-term care (LTC) 
services cannot meet expected greater demand in the coming decades (Kaye et al., 
2010).   Most OECD countries’ government programs for people with LTC needs 
beyond what family and friends can provide are already requiring greater cost-
sharing by individuals, especially those whose incomes are at least in the upper 
quartile of the income distribution (Costa-Font, Courbage, Swartz, 2015).  The 
combination of expected increased need for LTC and limited government resources 
is prompting efforts to create programs or incentives so higher middle-income 
people (i.e., incomes between the 70th and 90th percentile of the income 
distribution) will protect themselves from the risk of high costs of LTC.  Very 
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wealthy people presumably have sufficient financial resources to finance their LTC 
needs.  
Public policies that provide incentives for higher middle-income people to purchase 
private long-term care insurance (LTCI) have been proposed as a way to shield large 
numbers of middle-income people from the risk of needing costly LTC.  However, 
the conditions for efficient markets for private LTCI cannot be met and so premiums 
for LTCI policies are inefficiently high (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007).   In particular, 
there are too many uncertainties about the future costs of long-term care services, 
the types of LTC services that will be needed, the probability that a particular 
person will need LTC services later in life, and expected years of life remaining given 
that the person does need care (Barr, 2010).  Consumers’ decisions about 
purchasing LTCI are affected by these uncertainties as well as uncertainty about 
whether today’s insurers will still be financially viable decades in the future.1  In 
addition, LTCI policies are complicated, making it difficult for many people to 
complete the process of purchasing a policy, and myopia about the risk of needing 
LTC seem to cause many middle-income people to forego purchasing LTCI policies 
(Costa-Font, Courbage, Swartz, 2015; Colombo et al., 2011).  As a result, the markets 
for LTCI in the United States and France – the OECD countries with the most active 
market for private LTCI – are small relative to estimated numbers of people who 
could afford to purchase LTCI.  Between 7 and 8 percent of Americans over the age 
                                                        
1
 In the United States, 10 of the top 20 long-term care insurers (ranked by sales of policies) 
withdrew from the LTCI market between 2007 and 2012 (Green, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 
2012; available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203961204577269842991276650).  
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of 50 (about 8 million people) are estimated to have LTCI (Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation, 2014; SR Johnson, 2015) and even in France, which has the largest 
share of people with LTCI of any OECD country, only 17 percent of people over the 
age of 65 had a LTCI policy in 2011 (Colombo et al., 2011).  In most OECD countries, 
the markets for private LTCI are very small if they exist at all. 
Despite the academic arguments that the necessary conditions are missing for 
private LTCI markets to be efficient, there is persistent interest among policymakers 
in promoting their growth as a way of expanding the ability of middle-income 
people to pay for LTC.  Tax incentives have been used in a few OECD countries (e.g., 
the US, Australia, Spain, and Mexico) to reduce the effective price of LTCI and 
thereby encourage more people to purchase coverage.  Evaluations of such 
preferential tax treatment in the American states suggest that they have only a 
modest effect on purchases.  Further, because the people who take advantage of the 
tax subsidies are higher-income people, they are least likely to qualify for Medicaid 
coverage and therefore the states are foregoing more in tax revenues than they are 
saving in Medicaid spending (Goda, 2011).     
Another public policy to promote purchases of private LTCI that has gained modest 
traction in the US is the Partnership Program, which is a public-private venture.  The 
incentive for people to purchase Partnership LTCI policies is that if their LTC needs 
exceed the value of their insurance policy, they can enroll in the public Medicaid 
program (which paid 40 percent of all LTC expenditures in 2012 [Reaves and 
Musumeci, 2014]) and still protect their savings and assets up to the value of the 
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insurance policy.  That is, they do not have to spend down these assets before 
qualifying for Medicaid. The incentive for states to offer these Partnership Program 
LTCI policies is that individuals who purchase these policies delay Medicaid 
enrollment, thereby saving states some future Medicaid costs.   
Unfortunately, the hopes for the enrollment (or take-up) rate of Partnership 
Program policies exceed its current enrollment (Bergquist et al., 2015). 
Understanding why the Partnership Program is not a success may provide 
important lessons for other counties that have been interested in creating similar 
public-private ventures.  In brief, we argue the Partnership Program suffers from 
the same uncertainties that cause markets for private LTCI to fail to be efficient.  The 
state governments are unable to offer sufficient assurances to consumers and 
insurers that the future costs of LTC services will not be far higher than at present.   
In what follows, we review the structure and public-private nature of the 
Partnership Programs.  We then briefly describe the trends in sales of both regular 
private LTCI policies and Partnership LTCI policies to show that both experienced 
low purchase rates.  Implementation efforts for the Partnership Programs were very 
modest, in part because many were launched around the same time as the 
Affordable Care Act was passed.  At the same time, there was a good deal of publicity 
about several well-known insurers withdrawing from selling private LTCI.  The fact 
that the states could not offer more assurances that the Partnership Program 
insurance policies would retain their value and be able to pay for LTC costs years in 
the future provides a cautionary tale.  In particular, public efforts to expand private 
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insurance coverage for LTC need to address the reasons why markets for private 
LTCI have so far failed to be efficient.  We cannot expect consumers to view 
Partnership-type public-private programs any differently than traditional private 
LTCI unless government can reduce the inherent uncertainties about the future of 
LTC costs and risks. 
Partnership for Long-Term Care Program 
Background 
Many explanations have been offered for why relatively few Americans have private 
long-term care insurance (Frank, 2012; Brown and Finkelstein, 2011).  Chief among 
these is that purchasing LTCI is not straightforward – people must consider how 
much of their own savings and assets they will be able to spend on LTC many years 
in the future.  This is a cognitively costly exercise if taken seriously.  People must 
also assess trade-offs between how much they pay in an annual premium and the 
amount they estimate they will pay out-of-pocket for LTC in the future, especially 
when companies can increase their insurance premiums.  For many middle-income 
people, LTCI is not a rationally good financial investment.  
Another explanation is that many Americans believe – erroneously – that Medicare 
and private health insurance cover many expenses for LTC, and Medicaid will cover 
LTC as a last resort if they exhaust their savings and assets.  The expectation that 
Medicaid will cover LTC so a person does not need to purchase LTCI is referred to as 
“Medicaid crowd-out” of LTCI (Brown et al., 2007; Brown and Finkelstein, 2004; 
Pauly, 1990; Costa-Font and Courbage, 2015). However, evidence on the extent of 
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Medicaid crowd-out is limited.  Wiener et al. (2013) estimate only about 10 percent 
of the previously non-Medicaid population ages 50 and older spent down to 
Medicaid eligibility, and those that did are disproportionally lower income and 
community residents using personal care services.  
Despite little evidence of a Medicaid crowd-out effect, the notion has traction.  One 
reason is that Medicaid has been the largest funder of LTC expenditures in the last 
decade.  Forty percent of LTC expenses in 2012 was financed by Medicaid (Reaves 
and Musumeci, 2014).  And although half of Medicaid’s expenditures for LTC are for 
people younger than age 65, the projected growth in the elderly population as the 
baby-boomers retire has policymakers very concerned about Medicaid’s financial 
viability.2   
Partnership Program Incentives 
The Partnership for Long-Term Care Program (LTCP) was designed to potentially 
reduce the financial pressure on Medicaid to pay for LTC.  Historically, public-
private partnership programs have involved government incentives for private 
companies to build large public infrastructure projects or manage utilities.   The 
LTCP builds on this notion but involves three partners: a federal-state program 
(Medicaid) supporting the insurance scheme, private insurance companies willing 
to sell specific designs of LTCI, and individuals who might purchase the Partnership 
LTCI policies.  The program was originally established in the early 1990s in 
                                                        
2
 Such concerns already have had a policy impact: the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act extended from 
three to five years the look-back period for checking for transfers of assets prior to an individual 
being able to qualify for Medicaid.   
 8 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York through grants from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), which had fostered the idea through a 
demonstration program.3  Shortly after these four states created their LTCPs, the 
U.S. Congress passed legislation that prohibited other states from implementing 
Partnership programs.  But by 2005, with growing Medicaid expenditures for LTC, 
Congress reversed its stance and authorized the expansion of LTCPs in other states.  
By 2013, 41 states (including the original four) had implemented Partnership 
programs for LTCI.   
The Partnership Program concept is based on the assumption that middle-class  
people (who would neither qualify for Medicaid nor self-insure their LTC needs) will 
be more likely to purchase a LTCI policy if they can protect a significant share of 
their assets in the event of their LTC expenses exceeding some threshold that would 
cause them to depend on Medicaid.  Most traditional LTCI policies are designed to 
protect the insurer from adverse selection.  They limit the amount of LTC expenses 
they cover and the majority also cap the duration of the insurance benefits at three 
to five years once the benefits begin.   Thus, after a person’s insurance benefits are 
exhausted, they become responsible for covering all of their LTC costs.  For many 
people, this means they must deplete their savings and assets to pay their LTC 
                                                        
3
 James Knickman and Nelda McCall are credited with pushing the concept of the 
Partnership Program and interesting the RWJF in funding a demonstration of the concept 
(Alper, 2007).  Knickman credits Jeffrey Merrill (then a foundation vice-president) and 
Stephen Somers (a foundation program officer at the time) with getting the demonstration 
program funded by the foundation in 1987.  Mark Meiners (then at the University of 
Maryland) was in charge of the national program office that designed and ran the 
demonstration program (Alper, 2007).  In the planning phase of the RWJF initiative, eight 
states received planning grants: the four that established the LTCP programs plus 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 
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expenses.  Once they exhaust their assets (except for their equity in a home and a 
car), they are likely eligible for Medicaid to pay for their LTC either at home or in a 
nursing facility.  Thus, the Partnership Program provides an incentive for middle-
class people to purchase LTCI (Meiners, 2009): after an individual exhausts her LTCI 
benefits and then qualifies for Medicaid, the Partnership LTCI policy protects her 
assets up to the value of the policy.  The protected assets do not have to be spent 
before the person can qualify for Medicaid.  
The Partnership Program has two advantages for policyholders: protection of some 
assets and lower premiums than traditional LTCI because Partnership policies 
generally cover a shorter amount of time (one to three years) than traditional LTCI 
policies (often three to five years).  In addition, income earned on protected assets 
can be applied to the cost of care, providing yet further resources for paying for LTC 
(Meiners, 2009).  The Program’s advantage for state governments is that people 
who purchase Partnership LTCI policies may not need Medicaid to help pay for LTC 
at all or as early as they would otherwise.  If more people’s initial three years of LTC 
expenses are covered by insurance, the growth in states’ expenditures for Medicaid 
might be reduced.  The potential savings are especially important with larger 
numbers of elderly expected to need help in financing LTC in the next two decades. 
Thus, advocates of the Partnership Program anticipate that middle-class people who 
in the past have not been interested in purchasing LTCI will be enticed to do so 
because of lower premiums and the ability to protect more of their assets.  
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Evaluation of Partnership Programs’ Effects 
There is an ongoing debate about whether or not sufficient time has passed for an 
assessment of the four original Partnership Programs.  Program redesigns in the 
late 1990s – particularly in California and Connecticut – contributed to a belief that 
the programs’ effects in the years before 2000 could not be evaluated well 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2004; Meiners et al., 2002).   
Previous assessments of the Partnership Programs focused largely on the numbers 
of policies sold and their impact on state Medicaid expenditures for LTC.  (A full list 
of such studies is available upon request).  Two such studies are worth noting 
because they have influenced more recent perceptions of the Programs’ effects.  A 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in 2007 found that Medicaid 
savings were not likely, but Medicaid costs would be minimal because GAO assumed 
that many participants would still be too wealthy to qualify for Medicaid.  The GAO 
study also assumed policyholders do not over-insure their assets, which is a major 
source of potential Medicaid savings, and it assumed people do not often transfer 
their assets to others in order to qualify for Medicaid (U.S. GAO, 2007; Meiners, 
2009).  Sun and Webb’s (2013) numerical optimization study suggests the 
Partnership Programs increased insurance coverage only among single individuals 
(by 4-5 percent), and that Partnership policies have been purchased mostly by 
people who, absent the availability of the Partnership Programs, would have 
purchased traditional LTCI.  Hence, the Partnership policies appear to be largely 
substitutes for traditional LTCI contracts.  
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Traditional and Partnership LTCI Sales in Original Partnership States: 2000 and 2008 
The number of people covered by private LTCI policies of all types (traditional and 
Partnership) show low market penetration between 2000 and 2008 (Figure 1). To 
put Figure 1 in perspective, recent estimates indicate that sales of new LTCI policies 
were around 322,000 in 2012 compared to more than 700,000 new policies that 
were sold in 2002; approximately 8 million people have LTCI (according to the 
American Association of Long-Term Care Insurance and US Department of Health 
and Human Services (2006), as cited by SR Johnson (2015)).   
As Figure 1 indicates, the total number of people covered by LTCI (both traditional 
and Partnership policies) fell substantially in both 2004 and 2006-7.  Several factors 
contributed particularly to the decline in 2004: substantial rate increases for 
traditional LTCI went into effect in 2004, rate stability regulations were passed by 
states starting in 2004, and two large long-term care insurers exited the market 
(Society of Actuaries, 2005).  We do not have a good explanation of the apparent 
rebound in sales in 2005-2006, and the fall-off in sales of all LTCI policies that starts 
in 2006-2007 – the apparent rebound may just reflect changes in small numbers 
rather than a change in trend.  The continued decline in sales past 2008 no doubt 
reflects the great recession and the sharp decline in the number of insurers actively 
selling a substantial number of policies (SR Johnson, 2015).4   
                                                        
4
 In 2002, there were 102 companies actively selling LTCI but within a decade (2012), fewer 
than 15 companies were selling a substantial number of policies (SR Johnson, 2015). The 
ten largest companies (ranked by number of sales) accounted for 78 percent of the market 
in 2013.   
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In both Connecticut and Indiana, Partnership policies have been a larger percentage 
of the LTCI market than in California and New York (Figure 2). The large increase in 
the Partnership share of the market in Connecticut and Indiana in 2004 is likely due 
to the decline in sales of traditional LTCI policies caused by the upsurge in 
premiums for traditional policies that year.  However, the decline in Partnership 
policies’ share of the LTCI market in 2005-2006 reflects a fall-off in Partnership 
sales while traditional policy sales rose again.  By comparison, Partnership policies 
in California and New York maintained a relatively steady percentage of overall 
sales, between 10 and 20 percent.  Given the much larger populations of California 
and New York, it is possible that the overall larger number of sales of both types of 
LTCI policies in these states is why Partnership policies account for a steady but 
smaller share of LTCI policies. 
Expansion Partnership Programs 
After Congress lifted the moratorium on the Partnership Program expansion in 
2005, most of the 37 new programs were implemented in 2008 or 2009.  Since then, 
sales of new Partnership LTCI policies have totaled less than 100,000 per year 
through 2012 among all the new programs (Figure 3).  The expansion programs are 
generating similar sales numbers as the four RWJF Partnership Programs, which 
sold approximately 20,000 contracts per year in total between 2000 and 2008.  
Looking at trends in penetration of Partnership sales, from 2009 to 2012 the 
number of newly issued policies in force per 100 people age 65 and older has 
consistently stayed between 0.6 and 0.4.  In 2012, across all expansion states, 
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approximately 0.43 newly issued policies were in force per 100 people age 65 and 
older.5  This rate is comparable to the penetration of Partnership sales in California 
and New York during the 2000-2008 time period.  
The expansion states’ aggregate numbers mask a good deal of variation in 
penetration rates.  West Virginia has a low number of policies sold and a relatively 
high percentage of the population is 65 and older.  At the other end of the spectrum 
are Florida, Minnesota, Texas, and Wisconsin; their combined sales make up about a 
third of all new Partnership sales among the expansion states.  In 2012, across these 
four states, approximately 0.652 newly issued polices were in force per 100 people 
age 65 and older, a rate that is well above the penetration rates seen in California 
and New York from 2000-2008.  
Given the relatively small number of Partnership LTCI policies sold in the original 
Partnership Program states between 2000 and 2008 (see Figure 4) and the increase 
in non-elderly who qualified for Medicaid on the basis of disability during the early 
2000s (Bergquist et al., 2015; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2006), 
it should not be surprising that Medicaid spending on LTC services has not slowed 
in the four states.  It is too early to expect to observe a slowing of Medicaid LTC 
spending per person in the 37 expansion Partnership states.   
                                                        
5
 Note that the first of the baby-boomers crossed the age 65 threshold in 2011.  Many purchasers 
of LTCI policies are younger than age 65 and if that number remained relatively constant, the 
penetration rate would be lower in 2012 in part because the denominator of people age 65 and 
older is larger. 
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In sum, the trends in sales of the original Partnership Programs between 2000 and 
2008 track the trends in sales of traditional LTCI policies.  The original Partnership 
states’ sales trends of both types of policies suggest that there may have been 
modest substitution of Partnership policies for traditional LTCI.  However, the basic 
trend in sales of LTCI did not grow substantially during this time period.  Equally 
important, among the expansion Partnership Programs between 2009 and 2012, the 
trend in Partnership policy sales is very similar to the trend in sales of the original 
RWJF Partnership programs between 2000 and 2008.  Thus, the sales data suggest 
that whatever factors were affecting sales of traditional LTCI were also affecting 
sales of Partnership policies.   
Primary Reasons for Modest Sales Numbers 
Affordability of Partnership policies is almost certainly the primary obstacle to 
greater market penetration.  State program data indicate that underwriting levels 
for the Partnership policies are as high as they are for traditional LTCI contracts, 
suggesting that Partnership premiums are inefficiently high (Bergquist et al., 2015).   
Moreover, a non-trivial share of applications has been denied each year, likely 
contributing to consumer apprehensions that they may not be approved even for 
Partnership policies.  The extent of underwriting also suggests that the Partnership 
programs have so far failed to attract sufficient numbers of healthy, younger middle-
income consumers who might reduce insurers’ concerns about adverse selection 
risk.    
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Another strong explanation for the modest sales numbers for Partnership policies is 
that marketing for Partnership plans was anemic so many consumers were unaware 
of their existence (Meiners, 2012; Alper, 2007).6  This could account for why 
Partnership sales are not a higher percentage of overall LTCI sales, particularly in 
New York and California, which have been less proactive about efforts to make 
consumers aware of the risks of high LTC costs.  Our analysis of the RWJF 
Partnership Programs could not account for implementation issues encountered by 
each state.  We do not know, for example, if the low level of sales of Partnership 
policies was due to people being unaware of their availability or insurance agents 
being reluctant to recommend them to clients.   Commission-driven insurance 
agents may have had less interest in informing prospective buyers about the policies 
because commissions are based on premiums; the shorter-term Partnership policies 
have slightly lower premiums than the longer duration traditional LTCI policies 
(Meiners, 2012).   
Significantly, the timing of the expansion of the Partnership program (2008-2012) 
coincides with both the years of the great recession and state attention to the 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act (American health reforms).  This could 
explain a good deal of the lackluster sales of Partnership and traditional LTCI 
policies between 2008 and 2012.  The ACA included a section known as the 
Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, which would have 
created a voluntary social insurance program for LTC.  People who would have been 
                                                        
6
 It is noteworthy that recent findings from a national survey show that 75 percent of the 
respondents were unaware that Partnerships exist and 45 percent indicated they would consider 
purchasing private insurance if their state offered a LTCP (AHIP 2012).   
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involved in implementing the Partnership programs were caught up in debates 
about the viability of the CLASS Act, which was finally abandoned by late 2012.  
Finally, the Obama administration stopped funding aggregate data collection on the 
Partnership Programs in 2013, signaling the higher priority of other health reforms.  
 
Implications: Government Needs to Address Uncertainties 
The bad luck of timing and poor implementation management point to the 
underlying problem with the Partnership Program: it does not address the 
uncertainties in private LTCI markets.  The significant underwriting of premiums 
and premiums that are substantially higher than expected benefits should not be an 
unexpected outcome.  Even if the federal and state governments had focused on 
implementation, the current structure of the Partnership Program cannot overcome 
the fundamental uncertainties of an insurance product that is unlikely to pay out 
benefits for decades and the benefits themselves are not known. 
If the public policy goal is to have almost all people older than age 50 with higher 
middle-incomes have insurance for LTC, government programs (with or without a 
private sector component) need to reduce the uncertainties inherent in voluntary 
markets for LTCI.  This means that such efforts must require all higher middle-
income people to contribute an annual amount equal to a percentage of income to a 
fund designated solely for LTCI.  If private insurers are to offer LTCI plans that 
people can choose among, the plans’ benefit structures should be standardized to 
reduce the complexity of LTCI.  Further, if private insurers are to be involved in the 
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program, the government should determine which insurers are qualified.  With 
these stipulations, government can assure those with higher middle-incomes that 
they will have at least some minimum set of LTC needs covered no matter what the 
future costs of LTC may be.   
Regardless of whether a LTC policy initiative is a public insurance program or a 
public-private program with the conditions we have outlined, it protects higher 
middle-income people against the risk of catastrophic LTC costs.  It also protects the 
government from the risk that higher-income people may become poor enough to 
qualify for a government program for lower-income people with LTC needs.  The 
key point here is that public policies intended to encourage higher middle-income 
people to protect themselves from the risk of high LTC costs must address the 
uncertainties inherent in voluntary markets for private LTCI.  The Partnership 
Program failed to do that and the market outcome should come as no surprise.   
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Figure 1 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
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Figure 3: Expansion Partnership Programs: Policies in Force  
 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
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Figure 4  
 
 
 
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), 2012 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
P
e
r 
1
0
0
 P
e
o
p
le
 6
5
 o
r 
O
ld
e
r 
Partnership Applications vs Purchases 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York 
Applications Received - CA Policies Purchased - CA
Applications Received - CT Policies Purchased - CT
Applications Received - IN Policies Purchased - IN
Applications Received - NY Policies Purchased - NY
